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Trial-by-Trial Adaptation of Decision Making Performance 
- A Model-Based EEG Analysis 
van Vugt, M.1, Simen, P.2, Cohen, J.D.2  
1 University of Groningen, The Netherlands, ² Princeton University, New 
Jersey, USA 
Theoretical Background 
Whenever we engage in a task, it is crucial we monitor our performance to 
make sure that it does not decline. When it does decline, the performance 
monitoring system takes action to remedy that, e.g., by slowing down 
responding (Laming, 1979; Rabbitt, 1966). Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, 
and Cohen (2001) proposed that this slowing of response times (RTs) 
reflected conflict that stirred a performance monitoring system to action. 
There exist various decision systems that adapt performance (Daw, Niv, & 
Dayan, 2005), each of which have been associated with specific neural 
correlates. Some of the behavioral adjustment is thought to be implemented 
by the medial frontal cortex (MFC), thought to implement reinforcement 
learning mechanisms for behavioral adjustment (Cohen & Ranganath, 2007). 
This is contrasted to the striatum that is thought to implement rule-based 
behavioral adjustments. 
Activity of the MFC in EEG (electroencephalography) is typically associated 
with two components: the error-related negativity (ERN) in the first 100 ms 
after a response, and the feedback-related negativity (FRN) about 200–400 
ms post-response. Both components are more negative after errors when 
compared to correct trials, and opinions differ about what cognitive processes 
they reflect. The ERN covaries with individual differences in personality 
traits, e.g., with a participants’ tendency to learn more from negative than 
from positive feedback (Frank, D’Lauro, & Curran, 2007). The FRN covaries 
with valence of the feedback but not so much with its magnitude (Hajcak, 
Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006), although this has been disputed 
(Bellebaum & Daum, 2008). The ERN and FRN have both been related to 
reinforcement learning (RL) models of learning in decision making, and are 
thought to reflect prediction errors. Although good at describing across-trial 
dynamics, these RL models do not describe within-trial dynamics. 
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While Drift Diffusion Models (DDMs; Ratcliff, 1978) of decision making do 
not describe learning from successive decisions, they do describe within-trial 
dynamics. We have begun to relate electrophysiological data to DDMs (van 
Vugt et al, in preparation), and we wondered whether the ERN and/or FRN 
could have a role in setting the speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) in a 
perceptual decision making task. Answering this question could elucidate 
how the ERN and FRN, which are fairly similar potentials, differ (e.g., 
Heldmann, Rüsseler, & Münte, 2008), and how these across-trial dynamics 
relate to the within-trial dynamics described by the DDM. 
Drift diffusion models describe decision processes as random walks toward 
thresholds corresponding to the response alternatives, e.g., “left” and “right”. 
As soon as a threshold is crossed, the participant emits the corresponding 
response. The drift rate of the random walk reflects the quality of the data on 
which the decision is based, whereas the decision threshold is under the 
participant’s control and reflects SATs. When a participant increases her 
decision threshold, she will accumulate more evidence before responding, 
i.e., act more conservatively. Her RT consists of the time it takes to reach the 
decision threshold, together with a non-decision time, reflecting fixed 
perceptual and motor delays. 
We predict that behavioral adjustments after errors are reflected in an 
increased decision threshold. Furthermore, if the ERN/FRN not only reflects 
error awareness but also commitment to behavioral adjustment, then we 
predict that the magnitude of this component predicts the magnitude of the 
threshold adjustment. Finally, the magnitude of the ERN within a subject 
should predict RTs on the next trial. 
Methods 
Task: Participants performed a perceptual decision making task in which they 
judged the direction of motion of a display of randomly moving dots, a subset 
of which moved coherently to the left or the right. These random dot 
kinematograms were similar to those used in a series of psychophysical and 
decision making experiments involving monkeys (e.g., Britten, Shadlen, 
Newsome, & Movshon, 1992; Gold & Shadlen, 2001; Shadlen & Newsome, 
2001). Stimuli consisted of an aperture of approximately 7.6 cm diameter 
viewed from approximately 100 cm (approximately 4 degrees visual angle) in 
which white dots (2 x 2 pixels) moved on a black background. A subset of 
dots moved coherently either to the left or to the right on each trial, whereas 
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the remainder of dots were distractors that jumped randomly from frame to 
frame. Motion coherence was defined as the percentage of coherently moving 
dots. Dot density was 17 dots/square degrees, selected so that individual dots 
could not easily be tracked. Following the procedure used in Simen, 
Contreras, Hu, Holmes, and Cohen (2009), stimuli remained visible until 
participants made a response, at which point the stimulus disappeared and a 
variable response-to-stimulus interval ensued. Correct responses were 
rewarded with $0.01, errors were unrewarded. Reward feedback was 
displayed visually and signaled with a tone after each trial. 
We manipulated response bias and response-to-stimulus interval (RSI; see 
Simen et al. (2009) for a review of the effects of these variables on 
behavioral performance in two-alternative forced-choice tasks with response-
terminated stimuli, and a comparison to the predictions of Bogacz, Brown, 
Moehlis, Holmes, and Cohen (2006)). Response bias was manipulated by 
changing the probability that the dots would move in one of the two 
directions from 0.5 (no bias) to 0.6, 0.75 and 0.9. For the purposes of this 
analysis, we collapsed across the two RSI levels. The experiment 
presentation code was written in PsychToolbox (Brainard, 1997). Dot stimuli 
were presented with PsychToolbox extensions written by J. I. Gold 
(http://code.google.com/p/dotsx/). 
Participants: Twenty-one members of the Princeton Community (15 female, 
mean age 20.1) participated in our experiment in exchange for payment. The 
experiment was approved by the Institutional Review Board of Princeton 
University. Subjects participated in four separate hour-long training sessions 
in which they became familiar with the task. At the end of these training 
sessions, we used performance on a psychometric block to determine the 
coherence at which they performed at approximately 80% correct. This 
coherence level was used for the two hour-long EEG sessions. 
Recording Methods: We recorded EEG data from 128 channels using 
Neuroscan EEG caps with a Sensorium EPA-6 amplifier. All data were 
referenced to the average of the mastoids and off-line rereferenced to an 
average reference after automatic bad-channel removal (Friederici, Wang, 
Herrmann, Maess, & Oertel, 2000; Hestvik, Maxfield, Schwartz, & Shafer, 
2007). 
Data Analysis: We fitted the behavioral data to the Drift Diffusion Model 
using the DMA toolbox (VandeKerckhove & Tuerlinckx, 2007). We 
computed the error- and feedback-related negativity in electrode Fz, where it 
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is known to be maximal, on 12-Hz low-pass filtered data (Holroyd, 
Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 2003). We baseline corrected each trial to 
the 100 ms prior to the response. The ERN was taken to be the average of the 
signal between 0–100 ms post-response. The FRN was taken to be the 
difference between the positive peak in the window 120–200 ms post-
response and the first negative peak thereafter, but before 325 ms (Holroyd et 
al., 2003). This peak window was determined from visual inspection of the 
ERN waveforms. 
Results 
We first asked whether participants adapted their decision threshold height 
after an error on the previous trial. Figure 1 shows that as predicted, 
participants adapt their decision thresholds after they commit an error, 
especially for trials in the highly biased conditions. Post-correct and post-
error thresholds differ from each other for the 0.75 and 0.9 bias conditions 
[t(20) = 2.41, p = 0.026 and t(20) = 5.86, p < 0.001, respectively], marginally 
for the 0.6 bias [t(20) = 1.77, p = 0.092] but not in the no-bias condition 
[t(20) = 1.039, n.s.]). 
 
Fig.1 Fitted DDM decision thresholds in the trials after a correct (blue) and incorrect (red) 
response. The thresholds are shown separately for the different response bias levels. 




Fig.2 Error-related negativity for the 0.75 bias condition (the condition that shows a 
modulation of the decision threshold). 
 
Fig.3 Individual differences in threshold adaptation correlate with the magnitude of the 
ERN in the 0.75 bias condition [r(19) = 0.47, p = 0.032]. 
We then examined the ERN magnitude to replicate the basic ERN result. 
Figure 2 shows that in fact there is an effect of errors in our data: there is 
both a difference between correct and error trials across all conditions in the 
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ERN window [0–100 ms post-response; t(83) = 2.13, p = 0.036] and in the 
FRN window [approximately 200-400 ms post-response; t(83) = 3.91, p < 
0.001]. 
Next, we asked whether the magnitude of the ERN correlates with individual 
differences in adaptation of the decision threshold. Figure 3 shows that for 
the 0.75 bias condition (which showed a significant difference in decision 
threshold between post-correct and post-error trials), there is indeed such a 
relation. For the other bias levels, this relation is suggestive, though not 
significant. In contrast to the ERN, there was no relation between the later 
FRN (appearing around 200-400 ms) and decision threshold adaptation [all 
correlations p > 0.17], except for a negative correlation between change in 
bias level and FRN magnitude at 0.9 [r(20) = -0.56, p = 0.0081], which we 
think may be spurious because this correlation is negative, rather than 
positive, as we would expect. Moreover, in the 0.9 bias condition participants 
typically resort to non-integrative responding (Simen et al., 2009). 
 
Fig.4 Increases in the ERN are associated with a longer RT in the next trial (p = 0.0291; 
sign-rank test). Error bars reflect standard error of the mean. 
If the ERN is related to decision threshold adjustments, then that should have 
consequences for behavior. We therefore asked whether the magnitude of the 
ERN in the 0.75 bias condition could predict RT on the next trial. In other 
words: an increase in the decision threshold should result in a longer RT.  To 
assess this, we split each participant's data in two halves based on ERN 
magnitude. We then computed the average RT in the small ERN and large 
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ERN trials for every participant. Figure 4 shows that as the ERN increases, 
the average RT will tend to increase for the 0.75 bias level. Although this is 
different from predicting RT on a single trial, it is, given the noisy nature of 
EEG, nevertheless a step in the right direction. 
Conclusions & Future Directions 
We have shown that after an error, the decision threshold increases. At the 
intermediate bias level of 0.75 for which the thresholds differed significantly 
between post-correct and post-error trials, this increase in decision threshold 
was associated with individual differences in the magnitude of the ERN (but 
not the later FRN). The ERN may therefore reflect consequences for 
performance in the next trial through an adjustment of the decision threshold, 
and this process of performance adjustment occurs very early on after error 
detection. This further supports findings by Bellebaum, Kobza, Thiele, and 
Daum (2010) that the ERN is modulated by the degree of learning people do 
from task performance. It also agrees with Gentsch, Ullsperger, and 
Ullsperger (2009), who found that the ERN was associated with an 
adjustment of performance, whereas the FRN was not. Post-error behavioral 
adjustment effects have previously been described in the N2 component in a 
flanker task (Forster, Carter, Cohen, & Cho, 2010). It remains to be 
determined whether N2 modulations also occur in our perceptual decision 
task, and if so, whether they too relate to decision threshold adaptations. 
One may wonder why we only observe decision threshold adjustments and 
ERN effects at the intermediate bias level (0.75), where more than half of the 
trials the stimuli move in a biased direction. It may be the case that 
participants are more focused on learning in these trials, because they are 
trying to figure out whether there is a bias, and how they should adapt to that. 
When there is no bias, participants simply focus on the stimuli; when there is 
a large bias participants resort to pre-emptive responding and do not pay too 
much attention to the stimulus (Simen et al., 2009). 
Our results have potentially important applications in the field of education 
research. The demonstrated relation between the ERN, one of the most robust 
electrophysiological indices, and adjustments in cognitive control, could be 
used to assess the effectiveness of educational interventions. Many of these 
interventions involve monitoring current behavior and adjusting it as 
necessary (i.e., executive function), making the ERN a viable target for 
assessing its effects on the human brain. 
148 
 
Additionally, our work forms a bridge between cognitive modeling and 
cognitive neuroscience, by giving a formal description of the ERN in terms 
of model components. This link between the DDM and the ERN could be 
used to make strong predictions about the effect of behavioral manipulations 
on the ERN. Finally, this work suggests that it may be useful to extend the 
DDM to account for sequential effects, such that it can explain the post-error 
threshold adjustment that we observed. 
Literature 
Bellebaum, C., & Daum, I. (2008). Learning-Related Changes in 
Reward Expectancy Are Reflected in the Feedback-Related Negativity. 
European Journal of Neuroscience, 27(7), 1823–1835. 
Bellebaum, C., Kobza, S., Thiele, S., & Daum, I. (2010). It Was Not 
MY fault: Event-Related Brain Potentials in Active and Observational 
Learning from Feedback. Cerebral Cortex, 20, 2874–2883. 
Bogacz, R., Brown, E., Moehlis, J., Holmes, P., & Cohen, J. D. (2006). 
The Physics of Optimal Decision Making: A Formal Analysis of Models of 
Performance in Two-Alternative Forced-Choice Tasks. Psychological 
Review, 113(4), 700–765. 
Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, 
J. D. (2001). Conflict Monitoring and Cognitive Control. Psychological 
Review, 108(3), 624–652. 
Brainard, D. H. (1997). The Psychophysics Toolbox. Spatial Vision, 
10, 443-446.  
Britten, K. H., Shadlen, M. N., Newsome, W. T., & Movshon, J. A. 
(1992). The Analysis of Visual Motion: A Comparison of Neuronal and 
Psychophysical Performance. Journal of Neuroscience, 12(12), 4745–4765.  
Cohen, M. X., & Ranganath, C. (2007). Reinforcement Learning 
Signals Predict Future Decisions. Journal of Neuroscience, 27, 371–378.  
Daw, N. D., Niv, Y., & Dayan, P. (2005). Uncertainty-Based 
Competition between Prefrontal and Dorsolateral Striatal Systems for 
Behavioral Control. Nature Neuroscience, 8, 1704–1711.  
Forster, S. E., Carter, C. S., Cohen, J. D., & Cho, R. Y. (2010). 
Parametric Manipulation of the Conflict Signal and Control-State Adaptation. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(4), 923–935.  
149 
 
Frank, M. J., D’Lauro, C., & Curran, T. (2007). Cross-Task Individual 
Differences in Error Processing: Neural, Electrophysiological, and Genetic 
Components. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7(4), 297–
308.  
Friederici, A. D., Wang, Y., Herrmann, C. S., Maess, B., & Oertel, U. 
(2000). Localization of Early Syntactic Processes in Frontal and Temporal 
Cortical Areas: A Magnetoencephalographic Study. Human Brain Mapping, 
11(1), 1–11.  
Gentsch, A., Ullsperger, P., & Ullsperger, M. (2009). Dissociable 
Medial Frontal Negativities from a Common Monitoring System for Self- 
and Externally Caused Failure of Goal Achievement. NeuroImage, 47, 2023–
2030.  
Gold, J. I., & Shadlen, M. N. (2001). Neural Computations that 
Underlie Decisions about Sensory Stimuli. Trends in Cognitive Science, 5(1), 
10–16.  
Hajcak, G., Moser, J. S., Holroyd, C. B., & Simons, R. F. (2006). The 
Feedback-Related Negativity Reflects the Binary Evaluation of Good Versus 
Bad Outcomes. Biological Psychology, 71(2), 148–154.  
Heldmann, M., Rüsseler, J., & Münte, T. F. (2008). Internal and 
External Information in Error Processing. BMC Neuroscience, 9, 33.  
Hestvik, A., Maxfield, N., Schwartz, R. G., & Shafer, V. (2007). Brain 
Responses to Filled Gaps. Brain and Language, 100(3), 301–316.  
Holroyd, C. B., Nieuwenhuis, S., Yeung, N., & Cohen, J. D. (2003). 
Errors in Reward Prediction Are Reflected in the Event-Related Brain 
Potential. NeuroReport, 14(18), 2481–2484.  
Laming, D. (1979). Choice Reaction Performance Following an Error. 
Acta Psychologica, 43, 199-224.  
Rabbitt, P. M. A. (1966). Errors and Error Correction in Choice-
Response Tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 71(2), 264–272.  
Ratcliff, R. (1978). A Theory of Memory Retrieval. Psychological 
Review, 85, 59-108.  
Shadlen, M. N., & Newsome, W. T. (2001). Neural Basis of a 
Perceptual Decision in the Parietal Cortex (area LIP) of the Rhesus Monkey. 
Journal of Neurophysiology, 86(4), 1916–1936.  
150 
 
Simen, P., Contreras, C., D.and Buck, Hu, P., Holmes, P., & Cohen, J. 
D. (2009). Reward-Rate Optimization in Two-Alternative Decision Making: 
Empirical Tests of Theoretical Predictions. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 35(6), 1865–1897. 
VandeKerckhove, J. A., & Tuerlinckx, F. (2007). Fitting the Ratcliff 
Diffusion Model to Experimental Data. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
14(6), 1011–1026. 
Acknowledgements 
The authors gratefully acknowledge funding from the AFOSR Multi-
University Research Initiative FA9550-07-1-0537, and Conte Center 
MH062196 grants. They also like to thank Valerie Karuzis, Jillian Brinberg, 
Peter Foster, Laura deSouza, and Brian Schilder for help with testing 
participants.  
